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REVIEW 
 
Arnold I. Davidson, Frédéric Gros (eds.), Foucault, Wittgenstein: de possibles ren-
contres (Éditions Kimé, 2011), ISBN: 2841745554 
 
Drawing a parallel between Foucault and Wittgenstein, two authors that belong to the dif-
ferent traditions of analytical and the continental philosophy, is most definitely a hard job. 
Even though we have textual proof that Foucault was aware of Wittgenstein’s work, often 
there is a level of discontinuity between their approaches to the creation and formulation of 
different philosophical issues.  In the body of his work Foucault only makes a few general 
references to Wittgenstein, whom he always mentions alongside other analytical authors. 
However, the convergence of ideas between these two authors is sometimes so strong that 
we cannot help to envision the possibility of an intellectual overlap. 
A certain familiarity between Foucault and Wittgenstein was first observed by Ian 
Hacking and Arnold I. Davidson,1 who drew elements and concepts from both authors for a 
practical analysis of certain historical and epistemological issues.  A further challenge is to 
create and enable a conceptual space for this meeting of minds to take place.  Such a task 
does not merely seek a solution to the historical-philosophical issue, but rather takes the 
shape of a conceptual and theoretical process.  It is an attempt to find a synthesis between 
the positions of two philosophers who do not share a common background, but a common 
attitude toward traditional philosophy. 
In pursuit of this challenge, an international group of researchers came together for a 
public lecture at the ENS in 2007.  Foucault, Wittgenstein: de possibles rencontres, edited by Da-
vidson and Gros, is the result of that meeting.  The book collects seven essays, each presen-
ting a different attempt at building a shared conceptual space, each approaching the same 
matter from a different point of view. 
The essays can be roughly divided in three thematic areas.  Firstly, most essays take 
into account how Foucault and Wittgenstein seem to share a common critical stance to-
wards previous philosophical theories.  The essays note how both Foucault and Wittgen-
stein are critical of traditional philosophy, and are particularly against the idea of a deduc-
                                                 
1 Arnold I. Davidson, The emergence of sexuality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Ian Hac-
king, Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Ian Hacking, Why does language 
matters to philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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tive and causal paradigm.  Foucault argues against the existence of an essential structure of 
history that provides a logical deduction of future events.  Similarly, Wittgenstein claims 
that there are no logical rules that provide a logical deduction of our linguistic behaviors. 
([Eustache] 13-20, and [Paltrinieri] 43-44)  Both philosophers appear to share a polemic view 
towards representationalist language conceptions.  Both are in opposition to the idea that 
language offers a complete representation of things.  Thus, the representation should not be 
used as a criterion to assess the truth or falsehood of a proposition. ([Savoia] 158; [Bibla] 
117) 
A number of the essays, then, go on to look into how Foucault and Wittgenstein’s 
critical outlook contributed to give birth to an immanent conception of philosophy.  These 
articles consider how both Foucault and Wittgenstein stated that concepts and discourses 
cannot be referred to an eternal rational structure, but are the byproduct of practices within 
a particular communitarian space. ([Eustache, Paltrinieri, Tiisala] 79) 
A second set of articles addresses Foucault and Wittgenstein’s shared interest in the 
productivity of practice when referred to the subject.  Both philosophers do not believe that 
the subject is an eternal substance: Wittgenstein identifies it as a product of the game of lan-
guage and Foucault as the result of power relations within the social space. ([Bilba, Volbers, 
Savoia] 181) 
We will be looking at the essays that compose Foucault, Wittgenstein: de possibles ren-
contres according to their division into seperate thematic areas. 
The essays by Stéphane Eustache, Tuomo Tiisala and Luca Paltrinieri, focus on the 
relationship between Foucault’s discursive practice and Wittgenstein’s conception of lan-
guage.  According to Wittgenstein, language is an autonomous process that we practice 
from the inside and which takes the shape of an activity to the undetermined rules of lin-
guistic game. ([Paltrinieri] 48)  This idea is compared to Foucault’s attempts to interrogate 
the condition of existence of the statements (in his archeological period) and to trace back 
the conditions of knowledge to a communitarian and historical context, composed by po-
wer’s relations (in the genealogy).  Wittgenstein’s structure of language and Foucault’s ra-
tionality can both be ascribed to practice. 
Stéphane Eustache’s essay is a philological attempt to look into how both philo-
sophers share an analytical descriptive method, an immanent construction of the object, 
that do not address to the universal but the particular: everyday things. (24)  Eustache iden-
tifies a shared method and attempts to verify whether this generates a continuity or an op-
position between the two philosophers’ thought. 
According to Eustache, both Foucault’s conception of the statement (énoncé) and his 
genealogical attempt to write a history of our concepts and our way of knowledge (con-
naissance) prevent a continuity with Wittgenstein’s theories. (30-31)  The methods of Fou-
cault’s archeology and genealogy are linked to a particular way of describing and resear-
ching the condition of existence, which is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein in what Eu-
stache calls his “conventionalist conception of language.” (25) 
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Eustache claims that the two philosophers are not in direct opposition, but that there 
is a divergence in their analysis: Foucault’s attempt to explain context is not eternal and 
universal, but particular and immanent, coherent with Canguilhem’s influence on his work. 
(35)  Although Foucault shares some elements of Wittgenstein’s thought, particularly in his 
critical approach to traditional philosophy, he develops his ideas in a different direction, 
which is in a lateral opposition with Wittgenstein. (37) 
However, Eustache’s use of the category of conventionalism to explain Wittgen-
stein’s conception of language is ambiguous.  According to Wittgenstein, language is not 
generated through “an agreement in opinions, but in form of life,”2 and should be accepted 
as such, without attempting to find any further justification for its existence. 
Paltrinieri and Tiisala’s essays start from the premise of this different definition of 
language in Wittgenstein.  Their goal is to match up Foucault’s archeology with Wittgen-
stein’s epistemological discussion of On Certainty.  In On Certainty Wittgenstein argues 
against Moore’s idea of truism and common sense as evident and eternal truths, remarking 
the primacy of action. ([Paltrinieri] 53)  Statements are not eternal but historically contin-
gent and dependent on their use inside a particular discursive practice. 
According to Tiisala, this concept is close to the Foucauldian idea, in L’archéologie du 
savoir, that the identity of a statement (énoncé) is linked to his function within a particular 
discursive practice. ([Tiisala] 91)  
Paltrinieri comes to a similar conclusion, having highlighted Wittgenstein’s anti-
essentialist stance, against the application, outside the scientific field, of the causal para-
digm.  Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’ can be related, in Foucault, to the archeological task of 
analyzing the space of discursive regularity—”le savoir”—that precedes scientific know-
ledge. (63)  The knowledge (savoir) occupies the same function of Wittgenstein’s common 
sense, creating a field that enables the communication between scientific statements and the 
whole of beliefs and certainties. 
Wittgenstein and Foucault’s work is characterized by the pursuit of the same issue: 
making the implicit level of this field explicit, without adopting a causal paradigm. (64) 
Their rejection of the causal paradigm takes the form of an immanent morphological 
description.  Paltrinieri links Foucault’s idea of ‘fictional history’—showing a different or-
der of possible truths—to Wittgenstein’s conception of imagination—that provides new 
perspectives in the functional dimension of the form of life.  A space of interaction between 
Foucault and Wittgenstein comes to life as both philosophers assume the impossibilty of a 
rational foundation for human knowledge.  They believe that knowledge is an act without 
foundation: philosophy becomes an immanent description of knowledge that assumes its 
opacity in order to show what Musil have called “the sense of possibility” in reality. (68) 
Among the pieces collected in the book Corneliu Bilba’s essay stands on its own. 
Bilba’s argument is based on the hypothetical proximity of Ferdinand De Saussure’s struc-
turalism to both Wittgenstein and Foucault’s thought.  According to Bilba, Saussure and 
                                                 
2 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, § 241. 
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Wittgenstein (in Philosophical Investigation) have a similar conception of language, since they 
both claim that the class of meanings of a sign is the result of its use. (121)  In order to relate 
this conception with Foucault, Bilba suggests a substantial reassessment of Foucault’s Ar-
cheology, seeing it as an attempt to add the sciences to structuralist analysis of discourse. 
(122)  Finally, he connects Wittgenstein’s form of life and Foucault’s genealogy through the 
concept of potency, which he views as a common character in Wittgenstein’s linguistic 
agreement and Foucault’s relations of power. (143-144) 
However, the perspective offered by Bilba overcomplicates the issue leading to po-
tentially misguiding conclusions.  Bilba seems to misunderstand what the meaning of Fou-
cault’s focus on the “immature sciences”3 is in the Archeology: the idea of a structuralist 
version of epistemology does not take into account the theory of thresholds4 which makes a 
distinction between Foucault’s point of view and epistemological research in general.  Also, 
there are no tangible advantages in offering a structuralist interpretation of both Wittgen-
stein and Foucault, which makes it questionable whether such a radical reading is necessary 
at all. 
Paolo Savoia, Orazio Irrera and Jorg Volbers’ essays are all concerned with the issue 
of subject. Wittgenstein and Foucault share a conception of philosophy as a practice, as a 
self-technique, capable of a transformative action on the subject himself. ([Tiisala] 79) 
Symmetrically to Paltrinieri, Tiisala and Eustache, this second group of essays takes 
Wittgenstein and Foucault’s critique on the representation of language as a starting point. 
Savoia, Irrera and Volbers focus their efforts on the role of subject instead, linking the con-
cept of immanent philosophy to the process of subjectification of the disciplinary power, in 
Foucault, and to the idea of training (Abrichtung) in Wittgenstein. ([Savoia] 174 and [Irrera] 
200) 
Both in the power and language fields, the subject is not seen as an external and 
eternal substance that preexists its actions, but as existing within the norms of language and 
power.  The essays thus look into Wittgenstein and Foucault’s shared conception of philo-
sophy as an immanent description with a particular focus on the role of subject. 
Volbers explores the points of convergence between Wittgenstein and Foucault in 
order to solve the problem of continuity and discontinuity between Foucault’s ethical sub-
ject and genealogical subject.  Wittgenstein’s idea of an existing internal relationship be-
tween the subject and its practice, helps to understand Foucault’s self-critical shift from the 
passive and power-determined genealogical subject to the active, ethical subject. (111) 
Savoia’s essay addresses the issue of the supposed conservative quality of Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy.  Savoia’s attempts to deny this controversial point and to bring the de-
                                                 
3 Ian Hacking, “Michel Foucault's Immature science” in Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2004). 
4 Michel Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir, (Paris: Gallimard, 1969); Michel Foucault, "(Discussion) n° 75" in 
Dits et Écrits vol.1 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). 
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bate on a further level by highlighting the complex link between Wittgenstein’s anti-essen-
tialist attitude—shared by Foucault—and his political thought. (181) 
This shared immanent conception of the subject demonstrates how both Foucault 
and Wittgenstein’s saw philosophy as a descriptive method, to show the possibility for 
change in a particular communitarian space.  The discussion of the issue of subject and the 
analysis of discursive practice lead to essentially the same conclusions: the philosophical 
task undertaken is that of making what is implicit explicit, assuming the subject’s opacity 
without seeking an external foundation. ([Savoia] 180-181) 
On the whole, the essays included in Foucault, Wittgenstein: de possibles rencontres, at-
tempt to track the critical attitude towards traditional philosophy shared by Wittgenstein 
and Foucault, and to rework their proximity in order to show a positive point of con-
vergence between them.  Though the focus of analysis varies in each article, the book has 
the merit of showing clearly the common philosophical stance of the two authors, who both 
strive to show the implicit level in a determinate field, without adopting a foundationalist 
attitude.  The result is a shared will to accept the opacity of the subject and of the know-
ledge act. 
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